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Railing against cognitivism is a noble pastime. Maybe even a heroic one. Some of us believe that
cognitivism hasn’t achieved all that much given its hegemonic status these last decades within the
sciences of the mind. Some of us wouldn’t be sorry to see the back of it.
What we need, though, is a positive project with which to replace cognitivism. Something
that coalesces around a core set of ideas that almost everyone agrees on as necessary starting
assumptions. You know, like the kind of thing people used to call a “paradigm.”
This is ostensibly what Daniel Hutto and Erik Myin set out to achieve in their new book.
Following the ground-clearing work of their earlier volume (Hutto and Myin, 2013), they now
seek to present “REC’s positive vision of cognition,” and to demonstrate how “REC puts its positive
story into action.” (REC still stands for Radical Enactive, Embodied account of Cognition.)
H&M acknowledge that cognitivism is a formidable opponent precisely because it already
has the kind of core set of ideas we’re after: it is committed to representationalism and
computationalism about mind, and to the view that explanations of mental phenomena should
be mechanistic (i.e., that explanations should identify discrete component parts and the sequence
of causal connections between them; contrast this with dynamical explanations which do not have
this linear structure).
What does REC have to offer in place of these? Essentially, H&M offer a developmental story.
Their claim is that non-basic, content-involving minds—that is, minds that are capable of using
language, reasoning about absent entities, etc.—develop from basic minds through the mastery
of “socio-cultural practices” in childhood. H&M call this their “duplex account” of cognition: a
“nonbasic mind” is built on top of the basic, like a second storey built on top of a bungalow. Theirs is
a “multi-storey story.” (It is an appealing story, and it is compatible with a strand of early twentieth-
century theorizing, notably by Lev Vygotsky and G. H. Mead. Neither of these figures is mentioned
by H&M.)
Having a story is good. But what comes next? How are we to take this story and turn it
into a productive programme of research? H&M align themselves with three existing empirical
programmes: autopoietic adaptive enactivism, ecological psychology, and dynamical systems
theory. These approaches are united, for H&M, less by what they share than by what they reject.
Each approach is compatible with antirepresentationalism about basic minds, or with the view
that “enactive, embodied activity does not always and everywhere involves [sic] thinking about
the world in contentful ways.” But if we wish to build a post-revolutionary cognitive science, is it
enough to say that we are against representations?
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What’s most frustrating about reading H&M is that the
things they criticize their opponents for are the very things they
themselves are frequently guilty of. They sneer at “the general
tendency of philosophers—especially those in some wings of the
analytic tradition—to assume that the essence of phenomena
can be investigated independently of science.” Yet when H&M
themselves appeal to empirical findings it can feel as if they are
doing so only for rhetorical effect. Little effort is made to explain
the research to the reader: What was investigated? How was it
done? The authors typically rely on second-hand descriptions
of research findings from the writings of other philosophers,
or at best they’ll rely on the original researchers’ descriptive
summary.
Worse, when the authors try to identify empirical work
that exemplifies the REC way of doing science they draw a
blank, and feel compelled to tell us that to buy into the REC
programme at this point “is still to place one’s bets on an
emerging rather than established paradigm.” This is an odd
admission. Are examples of good REC-type science really so hard
to find? All three of the approaches the authors align themselves
with—dynamical, ecological, autopoietic—have been producing
empirical findings for over 30 years. Why not tell us about some
of this work? (See, e.g., Schöner, 2008; Chemero, 2009; Di Paolo
et al., 2017).
Three chapters toward the end of the book seek to co-
opt existing strands of research from mainstream cognitive
science and to bring them into REC’s remit. Thus H&M argue
that REC is compatible with currently popular accounts of
perceiving, imagining, and remembering. A chapter is given
over to each. The conclusion is always the same. Respectively:
predictive coding accounts of perceiving, mental modeling
accounts of imagining, and social interaction theory accounts of
remembering—all are compatible with antirepresentationalism
about basic minds.
The question that H&M seek to address is an important
one, even if their answers are underwhelming. The question
bears repeating: what should be at the core of a non-cognitivist
approach to the mind? Antirepresentationalism is not enough
here. The problem with antirepresentationalism is that it does
not tell us how to ask new empirical questions, only how not to
ask them. An attractive alternative response is this: relationalism.
What the three embodied approaches do have in common is
a concern with relational structure within a cognitive system.
Specifically these approaches target the animal–environment
relation, or the fit between an organism and its surroundings.
This is the shift in thinking that is required to get beyond
cognitivism. Traditional cognitive science asks questions of the
form, What representations are implicated in the production of
this behavior? Relationalists instead ask, What structure in this
animal–environment system is being used in the regulation of
this activity? There is important philosophical work to be done
in clarifying how best to go about asking this second type of
question. H&M do not address this problem.
H&M’s book is so doggedly philosophical-in-the-analytic-
sense that it is hard to imagine how it could be translated
into a positive empirical programme. The science, though, will
continue to make progress. H&M should engage with it.
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